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1. Introduction
There is a broad interest in the e®ectiveness of education policy and in the returns to
education. However, because of the way that reforms are implemented it is often hard
to distinguish their impact from the e®ect of other confounding factors. Moreover, it
is rare that we can measure the long term impact of education policies on earnings.
The impact of compulsory schooling laws, \equal education opportunities" and
the potential bene¯ts or costs of non-selective schools are issues that are central to
education policy. The issues are important both from a growth and a distributional
perspective (see for example B¶enabou, 1996). In Western countries there has been
a drive to increase compulsory schooling, which is now around 9 years of education
(see Card, 1999 for a review). Moreover, in several countries there is an active debate
on the merits of selective education, whereby high performing students are placed in
special classes or tracks (streaming/tracking).
A Swedish educational reform in the 1950s and 60s o®ers a nearly ideal oppor-
tunity to address some of these issues. In 1950 the Swedish parliament decided to
extend compulsory schooling from 7 or 8 years (depending on the municipality) to a
9 year comprehensive school with a centrally set curriculum. What makes this reform
of general interest is that it was preceded by a unique nationwide social experiment
between 1949 and 1962, when the new school system was ¯nally implemented. In this
experiment, the new comprehensive school was implemented gradually, by municipal-
ity. The experiment allows us to compare the educational and labor market outcomes
of a cohort of individuals going through two di®erent school systems in very similar
economic and social environments. The overall e®ect of the reform on educational
outcomes and earnings can, thus, be isolated from the e®ect of macroeconomic shocks
and cohort e®ects.
In addition to estimating the impact of the reform we assess the mechanisms
through which it operated by estimating returns to education. As in earlier stud-
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ies which have used institutional changes or reforms to identify a return to education1
we can use the comparisons between the reform and the non-reform municipalities to
this e®ect. However, for some groups of individuals we can go further than that: The
municipalities belong to 24 di®erent counties each of which can be thought of as con-
stituting a local labor market. By exploiting di®erences in the impact of the reform
across counties, probably due to di®erent local labor market conditions, we can esti-
mate the returns to education and, separately, the e®ect of the reform conditional on
educational outcomes. The procedure is similar to a di®erence in di®erences estima-
tion method, where the reform assignment acts as a group e®ect and the instruments
are interactions between the county of schooling and the reform.2 Such an approach
allows us to go some of the way towards distinguishing the e®ect of the reform through
the quantity of education and directly through the other changes that were brought
about, the most important of which was the abolition of selection into an academic
and vocational track at age 12 or 13. Our ability to do this depends on the reform
having had di®erential impacts across counties and this is true primarily for the low
ability children of low parental backgrounds. We are unable to o®er clear evidence on
this issue for all groups of children.
We interpret our results within a framework where the returns to the reform and
to education are heterogeneous. We use propensity score matching to control for any
di®erences in the distribution of characteristics between the reform and non-reform
municipalities (see Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983, and Heckman, Ichimura and Todd,
1997). In estimating the returns to education we use Instrumental Variables. The
interpretation of Instrumental Variable estimates when the impact of the treatment
di®ers across individuals has been discussed extensively in the treatment e®ects liter-
1See Angrist and Krueger (1991 and 1992), Butcher and Case (1994), Card (1993), Harmon and
Walker (1995), Kane and Rouse (1993).
2A similar approach was followed by Du°o (2000) in a recent paper in which she evaluates the
e®ects of a major school construction programme in Indonesia on education and wages. She also
estimates the returns to schooling by exploiting regional di®erences in the construction programme,
which induced di®erences in educational attainment.
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ature (Heckman and Robb, 1985, and Imbens and Angrist, 1994). We also exploit the
vast array of test scores and parental background variables at our disposal to estimate
impacts of the reform and the returns to education for di®erent groups. This allows us
to better interpret the impacts we observe and derive conclusions that are of a general
interest for economists, beyond the particularities of the Swedish experiments.
The empirical analysis of this social experiment is further enhanced by access
to unique data obtained by combining the Individual Statistics (IS) survey3 with
administrative sources. The IS survey is a random sample of about 10 percent of
Swedish individuals born in 1948 and was collected in 1961 when the individuals were
in sixth grade (aged 12 or 13). The data contains results from a large number of
test scores from IQ tests and grades of subjects taught in schools - all test results
were obtained before the split into the new and old school systems took e®ect.4 We
obtained earnings data for the 1985-96 period for each individual by matching the
sample with tax registers.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a brief description of the Swedish
education system and the 1950 social experiment and education reform. The details
are provided in an appendix. Section 3 presents a simple theoretical framework for
interpreting the results. Section 4 discusses estimation and the interpretation of the
estimates. Section 5 describes the data-set. Section 6 compares the characteristics of
the municipalities assigned to the reform to those not assigned. We then compare the
characteristics of the \treated" and \non-treated" individuals and establish that they
are very similar in terms of ability. In Section 7 we present results on the impact of
the reform on educational attainment, followed by results on the returns to education.
Section 8 concludes.
3This data-set is provided by the Department of Educational Science at the University of Gothen-
burg, see e.g. HÄarnqvist and Svensson (1973).
4See Angrist and Krueger (1998) on the importance of using ability measures that are not outcome
variables.
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2. The 1950 Education Reform
The pre-reform basic education consisted of two main parts: a basic compulsory school
(folkskolan) and a junior secondary school (realskolan). The ¯rst six years were com-
mon for all pupils. After the sixth grade the more able students were selected into
the junior secondary school. The selection was in general made on grades. Those
who failed to enter junior secondary school continued for one or two years in basic
compulsory school. The compulsory schooling was at least seven years and in some
municipalities, mainly in city communities, eight years. The basic compulsory schools
were administered by the municipalities.
Graduation from the junior secondary school was a requirement for the upper
secondary school, which, in turn, was required for one to qualify for higher education.
After a reform in 1958, those who graduated from junior secondary schools in general
had nine years of schooling, i.e. six years in basic compulsory school and three years
in junior secondary school, before they could enter the upper secondary school.
In 1950, the Swedish parliament decided on the principles for a major reform of the
school system. There were three stated aims of the reform: (1) Increase the education
of the least skilled. The number of compulsory years of education was extended to 9
years for all. In 1949, about 65 per cent of individuals did not complete any education
beyond the 7 or 8 year pre reform compulsory school (see Erikson and Jonsson, 1993).
(2) To facilitate the transition to higher education levels. Thus all pupils who ¯nished
the new compulsory comprehensive school quali¯ed for some secondary education. (3)
To promote equality of opportunity. Thus the introduction of a centrally decided
curriculum and the abolition of selection at sixth grade were intended to level out
di®erences in educational opportunities between children in di®erent areas or from
di®erent socio-economic backgrounds.
The ¯nal parliamentary decision on the reform, which set the curriculum of the
comprehensive school, was not taken until 1962. In the 13 year period preceding
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this decision - starting in 1949, the year before the ¯rst parliamentary decision - a
nationwide experiment with the new school system was carried out. In this experiment
the proposed comprehensive school was implemented in entire selected municipalities
or parts of city communities. At the time when the cohort we will be looking at
(born in 1948) was assigned to the experiment (1960/61) the number of municipalities
and city was 1,037. The way that the municipalities were assigned to the reform
is described in Appendix A. This assignment was not random but chosen by the
experimental committee to form a \representative" sample.
The pupils from low income backgrounds and in the municipalities participating
in the reform were paid a (means tested) stipend to help them through the extra time
in school. Moreover, an additional child bene¯t was introduced across all of Sweden
at the same time.
Details on how the experiment was conducted and ¯nanced are provided in Ap-
pendix A, together with a precise description of the institutions and how they changed.
We also discuss issues of compliance.
3. A simple Theoretical Framework for Interpreting Results
In this section we summarize some useful results from a simple theoretical model of
education choice, that are helpful in interpreting our empirical results. Many of the
ideas date from Becker and have been re-examined recently with empirical analysis in
mind by Lang (1993), Heckman (1997) and Card (2000).
Consider a simple two period model. In the ¯rst period the individual shares his one
unit of time between schooling s and work 1¡ s. In the second period the individual
works. Denote by qi(s) the costs of education and by q 0i(s) > 0 the marginal cost,
including tuition costs for individual i but not including opportunity cost. We assume
that the cost function is convex, q00i (s) ¸ 0: Wages in the ¯rst period are denoted by
w1ai while wages in the second period are equal to w2aimi(s) where mi(s = 0) = 1
and m0i(s) =
@mi (s)
@s > 0: ai is an individual speci¯c endowment of human capital
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(say ability), while mi represents the (possibly) individual speci¯c wage returns to
education. Utility in both periods is assumed to depend on consumption only and
not on education directly.5 Hence, the choice of education is driven by life-cycle
wealth maximization. Education choice is the solution to maxsf(1¡ s)w1ai ¡ qi(s) +
1
1+ri
w2aimi(s)g: The ¯rst and second order conditions for the choice of education level
s can be written as
First order condition: w2aim
0
i(s)
w1ai+q0i(s)
=1+ ri
Second order condition: w2aim00i (s) ¡ (1 + ri)q 00i (s) < 0:
(3.1)
where ri is the borrowing (discount) rate for individual i: In a perfectly competitive
market the discount rate is a constant (ri ´ r). In the presence of liquidity constraints
however, certain individuals will face higher discount rates ri while others lower. It is
easy to establish that
I @s@ri =
w1ai+q0i(s)
w2aim00i (s)¡(1+ri )q00i (s) < 0 II
@s
@ai
= (1+ri)w1¡w2m
0
i(s)
w2aim00i (s)¡(1+ri)q00i (s) > 0
III @s@w1 =
(1+ri)ai
w2aim00i (s)¡(1+ri)q00i (s) < 0
(3.2)
The ¯rst expression (I) implies that individuals with a higher discount rate ri will
obtain less education than otherwise. The second expression (I I), whose sign follows
directly from the ¯rst order conditions,6 implies that individuals with greater ability
will obtain more education, despite the increased ¯rst period opportunity cost. Finally,
the third expression (I II) establishes that an improvement in ¯rst period labor market
opportunities will lead to a decrease in educational attainment. .
We now consider the impact of the education reform on individuals with unskilled
parents and those with skilled parents. Assume (for now) that conditional on observed
ability, parental education has no in°uence on either the costs or bene¯ts of education;
however suppose that those with unskilled parents are liquidity constrained with bor-
rowing rate runskilledi > rskilledi ; where rskilledi is the discount rate for those whose parents
5However the costs of education could be thought to include any e®ort costs.
6Note from the ¯rst order conditions that w2m0i(s) > (1 + ri)w1:
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are skilled. Given ability, the reform will impact primarily on the education levels of
those with unskilled parents, since they will have lower initial levels of education due
to discounting. Within that group it should have a greater impact on those with lower
ability, since their optimal pre-reform level of education should be lower as implied
by the expression for @s@ai . Ability may a®ect m
0
i(s) with the same conclusions for this
point. For those with no liquidity constraints the change of the compulsory schooling
level will still have an impact to the extent that they are low ability and have a very
low marginal bene¯t (relative to cost) of education. Thus, we expect little, or no,
impact of the reform among those with skilled parents and high ability.
Finally note that liquidity constraints are just one interpretation as to why children
from poorer backgrounds have lower levels of education than equally able children from
wealthier parents. Other potential reasons include higher marginal costs (due say to
adverse social pressure) or lack of information about the returns.
4. Estimating the Impact of the Reform and the Returns to
Education
Our empirical analysis consists of two parts. In the ¯rst we evaluate directly the
impact of the reform on educational quali¯cations and on earnings. In the second we
use the reform to estimate the returns to education and assess whether the reform had
direct impacts on earnings other than those due to the increased levels of education.
4.1. The Impact of the Reform on Educational Quali¯cations and Earnings
If the reformwere truly randomly assigned we could estimate the average impact of the
reform simply by comparing the average educational attainment and earnings of those
who went through the reform system to the earnings of those who went through the old
system. Since random assignment has not taken place we evaluate the impact of the
reform on education and earnings using propensity score matching (Rosenbaum and
Rubin, 1983 and Heckman, Ichimura and Todd, 1997). The assumption underlying
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matching is that assignment to reform, conditional on our observables, is random and
independent of education and earnings in the non-reform state. This requires that
the observable characteristics are su±cient to explain any relationship that the reform
assignment may have had to earnings potential in the non-reform state. Matching
will make a di®erence to our estimates of the impact of the reform only to the extent
that the distribution of characteristics is di®erent in the control and the treatment
(reform) sample.
Formally, denote by lnw1it individual i's annual log earnings in period t if the
individual has been through the reform system. The same person's log earnings in
the non-reform state are lnw0it: Only one of these quantities is observed for each in-
dividual, depending on whether the individual has been assigned to the reform or
not. The impact of the reform for individual i then is lnw1it ¡ lnw0it. De¯ne TT =
E [lnw1it ¡ lnw0itjDi = 1] to be the impact of the reform on those actually assigned to
the reform (Di = 1).7 Under the matching assumption (selection on observables) we
can use the earnings of those not assigned to the reform (Di = 0) to estimate the av-
erage counterfactual earnings for those who were assigned, i.e. E [lnw0itjXi; Di = 1] =
E [lnw0itjXi; Di = 0] ; where Xi represents observed characteristics.
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) have shown that it is su±cient to match on the
propensity score instead of matching on values of the vector Xi: The propensity
score P (Xi) is the probability of assignment to the reform conditional on charac-
teristics Xi. De¯ne the observed log earnings as lnwi = Di lnw1it + (1 ¡ Di) lnw0it:
The treatment on the treated parameter can be written as T T = E [lnwijDi = 1] ¡
EF 1 fE [lnwijP (Xi); Di = 0]g where EF 1 denotes that the expectation is taken with
respect to the distribution of the propensity score in the treatment sample. The ¯rst
expression is the unconditional average in the treatment (reform) sample. The expec-
tation in the square bracket of the second part of this expression is the conditional
expectation of log wages given the propensity score, in the non-reform sample. This is
7Impact of treatment on the treated.
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then averaged using as weights the distribution of the propensity score in the sample
of the individuals who went through the reform.
To implement this matching estimator we estimate the propensity score using a
probit of the reform on our matching variables. We then use cubic splines with 4
knots to estimate E [lnwijP (Xi); Di = 0] on the sample of individuals not assigned to
the reform. We repeat this for the reform sample to estimate E [lnwijP (Xi); Di = 1] :
Each individual in the reform sample is matched to his nearest neighbor in the non-
reform sample, based on the value of the estimated score. At this point, we also
impose a tolerance level; if the absolute di®erence of the propensity scores between the
treated individual and the nearest neighbor in the control sample is not small enough
we reject that treated individual and leave him unmatched. We then average the
di®erence between the smoothed earnings of the treated individual (i.e., the estimate
of E [lnwijP (Xi); Di = 1]) and E [lnwijP (Xi); Di = 0] obtained from his nearest non-
reform neighbor, over the sample of the individuals assigned to the reform. This
method of matching is a modi¯cation of a method found by Heckman, Ichimura and
Todd (1997) to be particularly e±cient in practice.8 Finally, we use the bootstrap
to compute 95% bias corrected con¯dence intervals for the estimates of TT:9 The
con¯dence intervals we present allow for the fact that the propensity score is estimated.
We follow the same procedure when evaluating the impact of the reform on educa-
tional attainment. We use two measures of educational attainment: years of education
and highest quali¯cation.
4.2. Estimating the Returns to Education
We now turn to the estimation of the returns to education, using the reform as an
instrument. Within this context we will present a framework that will allow us to
test whether the reform operated exclusively through the changes in the quantity of
8The modi¯ cation consists in the fact that we also smooth the earnings of the reform individuals.
This tends to improve precision slightly.
9See Horowitz (1999).
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education it induced or whether it may also have had an additional direct impact on
earnings.
Education in Sweden consists of seven levels Sl (l = 1; :::; 7), including the pre-
reform basic school. Ideally we would estimate returns to each level, allowing for
nonlinearity (e.g. sheepskin e®ects) and for observed and unobserved heterogeneity of
the returns at each level.10 However, given that we have just one discrete instrument
identifying the average returns for each level of education separately is not feasible,
unless we impose strong functional form assumptions. We thus apply instrumental
variables (IV) in the wage equation
lnwit = qt + ³ 0xit + °edi + vi; (4.1)
where edi =
PL
l=1 !lSil and where !l are the numbers of years of education required to
reach education level l:We estimate this either on the whole population or by group
de¯ned by ability and parental education. The question is how does one interpret
such an IV estimate when the underlying returns are heterogeneous in the population
and there are potential non-linearities in the returns.
First, we take as an instrument the assignment to the reform, which is either zero
(not in the reform) or one. To understand what parameter our procedure estimates
denote by Sil(z) the schooling outcome as a function of the policy assignment. We
denote by wi(l) the wage individual i would have obtain if she had reached education
level l: We start by assuming that fwi(l); Sil(z = 1); Sil(z = 0); l = 1; :::; Lg are
jointly independent of the policy assignment given the observables x:11
When the treatment (education here) is binary and the response to the treatment
is heterogeneous across individuals, Imbens and Angrist (1994) have shown that IV
10See the model of Willis and Rosen (1979) and BjÄorklund and Mo±tt (1987) when estimating the
returns to training. A more general model would have been that of the Roy model for each education
level. See Heckman and Honore (1990) for the identi¯ability of this model.
11These include the county where schooling took place, the county of residence, a large array of
test scores, population size in the municipality, aggregate income of the municipality, the local tax
rate and whether it is a city or rural community. We also include parental education in some of the
regressions.
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with a binary instrument such as ours, estimates the average e®ect of the treatment
for those who were induced to take up treatment as a result of the policy (LATE12).
This result relies on the assumption of monotonicity, namely that the policy induces
some individuals to take the treatment which they would not otherwise have done and
no one to opt out who would have taken the treatment in the absence of the policy.13
The monotonicity assumption has been shown by Vytlacil (2000) to be equivalent to
an assumption that the treatment (education) choice can be modelled using a single
index based threshold crossing model.14 In the case where many intensities are possible
(i.e. many education levels) this implies that education choices are ordered and can
be explained by a single index model with thresholds that vary with characteristics
and are random.15
To the extent that the reform only a®ected attendance at the ¯rst two levels of
education, IV in 4.1 will estimate the return to education for those who were induced
into an extra year of education vis-¶a-vis the earlier statutory minimum. However, if
other levels of education were a®ected and under the monotonicity assumption for
multiple intensities IV, will identify a weighted average of the returns to education at
all levels of intensities a®ected by the reform (see Angrist and Imbens, 1995). The
weights are proportional to the impact of the reform on each education level and they
sum to one.16
In the context of the reform we are considering the monotonicity assumption most
12Local Average Treatment E®ect.
13Of course, the reverse would also be a suitable monotonicity assumption if the policy tended to
reduce treatment. In our context the policy is designed to increase education.
14As explained in Vytlacil (2000), this means that we can write Di = 1(m(x;z) ¸ u); where
1(a) = 1 if a is true and zero otherwise. Hence treatment choice can be expressed as a simple
threshold crossing model.
15An ordered probit is a special case of this. As shown by Cameron and Heckman (1998) in
the ordered probit case this implies that education choices are governed by just one unobservable.
However, allowing the thresholds to be stochastic leads to a more general education choice model.
We thank Ed Vytlacil who showed us this during a conversation.
16Trivially, if the reform just shifted persons from the old statutory level and into the new higher
one, the IV estimator will just measure the returns to education at the lower end of the education
distribution for the switchers.
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probably holds between the old statutory level of education and the new one. The
impact of the reform is small further up the education distribution.
The discussion above relies on the assumption that reform assignment was inde-
pendent of earnings given the observables. However if the reform had some impact
on the quality of education it may have a direct e®ect, as well as through the amount
of education obtained. We can address this issue to the extent that the reform had
di®erent impacts on education in di®erent counties, possibly due to di®erent education
costs or local labormarket opportunities at the time when the individuals were making
their education choice. In this case we can include the reform assignment indicator
among the observables and use the interactions between the county of schooling and
the reform indicator as an instrument. Thus we estimate
lnwit = qt + ±reformi + ³ 0xit + °edi + vi1; (4.2)
where ref ormi indicates assignment to the reform (1) or not (0).17 The instruments
are the interactions between the county of schooling and reform assignment.
The LATE interpretation can still be given. However the estimated parameter now
will be the weighted average of the impacts across municipalities for those induced to
attain higher levels of education by the reform. The weights depend on the number
of people induced into higher levels of education by the reform in each municipality.
Implementation of this approach requires us to con¯rm ¯rst that the reform did have
di®erential impacts across municipalities. Subject to this we can test whether the
reform assignment has an impact on earnings, conditional on educational attainment.
Finally, we consider estimating the returns to education for individuals with dif-
ferent levels of measured ability and di®erent parental education.
17Indicators for the county of schooling are also included among the x0s: This estimator is basically
a di®erences-in-di®erences estimator: Di®erence between reform and non-reform municipalities and
then between counties.
13
5. Data
We use data from the Individual Statistics (IS) project of the Institute for Education
at the University of Gothenburg18 merged with administrative data on education level,
reform assignment and pre-tax earnings obtained from tax records for the years 1985
to 1996.
The IS project has produced six separate data-sets corresponding to the birth
cohorts 1948, 1953, 1967, 1972, 1977 and 1982. We use the survey for the 1948 cohort
as this was themain cohort available that was split between the reform and non-reform
(old) system. The 1948 cohort survey was obtained in the spring of 1961 when the
respondents were 12 or 13 years of age and most of them in sixth grade in compulsory
school by the time of the survey.
All children born the 5th, 15th or 25th in each month in 1948, i.e., about 10 percent
of the cohort, were selected to be included in the sample. The potential sample size
is 12,166 men and women. With a rate of non-response for the 1948 survey of about
1.8 per cent, the ¯nal sample size was 11,950.
In 1961, the experiment with the new comprehensive school was still in progress
and, as is evident from Table 12 in Appendix A, 28 percent of the municipalities
had implemented the new school. The IS data-set contains a variable for individual
assignment to the reform which is obtained from the National school board register
and applies to the school year 1960/1961, i.e., the year when interviews and tests were
done. About 35 percent of the students in our data-set were assigned to the new
school. Assignment to the reform is measured in 6th grade before any switches to a
di®erent system could have taken place (see Appendix on compliance).
The data-sets consist of four main parts: (1) Information on the student's social
background, socio-economic situation, leisure activities and plans for future studies;
(2) Results from IQ and achievement tests; (3) Register information on the students
18See HÄarnqvist and Svensson (1973) for a detailed description of the project and the data.
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performance and type of school; (4) Annual earnings obtained from the 1985-1996
Swedish tax registers as well as information obtained from the education registers
from 1993.19
An important feature of the data, from a reform evaluation perspective, is that all
measures of student ability were obtained at an age when all students had the same
quantity of education and relate to the year before the children in the non-reform
sector were split between the two tracks (vocational and junior secondary). Thus, the
test scores are not the outcome of reform assignment or educational choice.
Information on levels of education were obtained from the so called SUN-code from
the National Education Register. We use information on seven broad educational
levels only, which are comparable before and after the reform. These levels are brie°y
described in Table 1 together with the corresponding names of equivalent US and UK
educational levels. We also report estimated average years of education corresponding
to each level.
Given the way the information is collected, and as we use comparatively broad
categories for levels of education, there is very little scope for measurement error in
education.20 This is important, particularly given concerns that when we include
controls for observed ability we reduce the signal from the education variable relative
to the measurement error variance, thus biasing the education e®ect downwards (see
Griliches, 1977). Moreover, as Kane, Rouse and Staiger (1999) in the case of levels of
19See Appendix B for descriptions on all these variables.
20Statistics Sweden has investigated the quality of the National education register (see Beskrivn-
ing av Statistiken Befolkningens Utbildning, 1999) by comparing the data with those obtained in a
questionnaire study. It was found out that in 83 % of the cases the results for the level of education
from the register coincided with those obtained from the questionnaires. This can be seen as an
upper bound of the rate of mis-classi¯cation in the National education register. The main source of
mis-classi¯cation was found to be between level 4 and level 5: Level 4 was over-estimated since sev-
eral un¯nished university education and vocational educations were not reported. KjellstÄom (1999)
has investigated the e®ect of measurement errors in imputed years of schooling for wage equations
including ability measures using the IS survey. His ¯ndings show that a reliability ratio of 0.9 has a
very small e®ect on the estimates of returns to schooling. See also a recent paper by Kane, Rouse and
Staiger (1999) who look at the impact of measurement error on estimated returns when measurement
error is non-classical. They also present evidence that levels of education are much better measured
in surveys than years of education.
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education measurement error is non-classical and having access to data with as little
measurement error as possible is important even when using Instrumental Variables.
We use the all test scores and grades included in the IS data set to measure
intellectual ability. In order to obtain a °exible speci¯cation we transformed the test
scores into decile groups and then generated indicator variables for each decile group
and each test score.21 In a second step, a principal component analysis was carried
out on all the indicator variables. Appendix B shows the result from this analysis.
For some of the empirical analysis we will divide the sample into two groups by
ability. To do that we use the ¯rst principal component (Abil1), i.e., the one accounting
for the largest share of the variance. Table 13 in Appendix B shows the factor loadings
of the ¯rst three principal component. Since the factor loadings of the ¯rst principal
component are increasing in test scores and grades (positive and increasing for above
median test scores; negative decreasing for below median scores) the interpretation of
it is unambiguous: It gives high numerical value for high achievers and low for low
achievers.
Sweden is divided administratively into 24 counties, each of which contains a num-
ber of municipalities within commuting distance of each other. The counties are often
used to de¯ne local labor markets (see e.g. Westerlund, 1997). Importantly, all coun-
ties but one had some reform and some non-reform municipalities.
The ¯nal sample size was 5744 men and 5540 women. For each we observe earnings
for the entire (or part of) the 1985 to 1996 period.
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Level Description of the Schooling Level Average Number of
Years of Schooling6
1 Pre-reform compulsory school 8
2 Post-reform comprehensive (compulsory school) or pre-reform 9
junior secondary school
3 Upper secondary school 6 2 years1 11.5
4 Upper secondary school > 3 years2 13
5 Post upper secondary school 6 2 years3 15
6 Post upper secondary school > 3 years (University/College)4 17
7 Ph.D. or licentiate5 degree at a University 21
Notes: 1This level corresponds mainly to vocational education.
2The threee or four year upper secondary schools have a more academic curriculum
compared to the those corresponding to level 3 and are required for most studies at the
college/university level. Corresponding to sixth form of a comprehensive school (UK)
and senior high school (US).
3Shorter college or university educations, e.g. educations for nurses and elementary
school teachers, as well as un¯nished longer university educations.
4Degrees from longer university or college educations, e.g. business administration, law,
engineering or medicine.
5The licentiate degree is a shorter, compared to the Ph.D., post-graduate university
education.
6Estimates of the average number of years of schooling for each level of education are
obtained from the Swedish Level of Living survey for the cohorts born between
1945 and 1955.
Table 1: Short descriptions of each education level and estimates of average number
of years of schooling for each level.
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6. Results
6.1. Comparing the Reform and Control Samples
As we described in Section 2 and Appendix A, the municipalities that implemented
the reform were not randomly chosen, although an e®ort was made to create a rep-
resentative sample. In this Section, we compare the characteristics of the reform and
non-reform samples.
The data-set contains information from individual IQ-tests as well as results from
several tests on knowledge in di®erent subjects taught at school.22 The results from
this comparison, i.e. the average scores on the di®erent tests for the two sub-groups,
are shown in Table 2. As can be seen in Table 2, the average results on these tests
are very similar, although one may argue that the municipalities that participated
early on had marginally more able students. In most cases the di®erences are not
statistically signi¯cant. Moreover, the proportion of skilled parents was higher in the
reform municipalities but, again, the di®erence is insigni¯cant. Our presumption is
that these results lend support to the idea that reform assignment is not correlated
with unobserved ability.
21We did not exclude the 385 individuals who had some missing ability indicators: We com-
bine all ability measures using principal component analysis, to construct ability measures for these
individuals.
22We know from earlier studies, e.g. Blackburn and Neumark (1995) or KjellstrÄom (1997), that
performance on these kind of tests is correlated with \ability" and probably also with individual
returns to education.
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Men Women
Non-reform Reform Non-reform Reform
IQ, Opposites 22.1 22.4 22.2 22.8
(0.14) (0.20) (0.15) (0.20)
IQ, Folding 21.5 22.3 20.0 20.7
(0.15) (0.21) (0.14) (0.20)
IQ, Mathematics 19.5 19.8 19.0 19.1
(0.17) (0.23) (0.16) (0.22)
Reading 37.4 38.1 36.7 37.2
(0.15) (0.21) (0.15) (0.20)
Writing 50.5 51.0 53.3 53.4
(0.21) (0.29) (0.20) (0.27)
Mathematics 41.7 41.9 40.0 40.1
(0.19) (0.28) (0.19) (0.26)
English 5.2 5.4 5.7 5.9
(0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05)
Share with father's 0.145 0.175 0.136 0.177
education > basic compulsory (0.0057) (0.0085) (0.0056) (0.0087)
Source: IS-suvey, 1948 cohort. Standard errors in parentheses
Table 2: Average test scores. Pre- and post-reform school systems. Men and women.
Standard errors in parentheses.
Table 3 compares some characteristics of the city communities and municipalities
which were included in the experiment to the excluded ones for the 1948 cohort.23 To
measure average income level we use the per capita income tax base in hundreds of
SEK in the municipality or city community. The tax level is the percentage level of
the proportional municipality/city community income tax. The data applies to 1960,
the year before the tests and interviews for the IS survey were carried out. Data on
father's education level is obtained from the survey and measures whether or not the
individual's father had more than six or seven years of compulsory schooling.
A larger fraction of the pupils in the reform groups live in Stockholm and in Swe-
den's second and third cities, Gothenburg and Malmo, compared to the control group.
However, since the comparison group includes communities in all these three cities the
matching method will control for this. The di®erences in the characteristics within the
other city communities and municipalities seem quite modest.24 The municipalities in
23The data on characteristics for each of the 914 municipalities and 123 city communities were
matched using the municipality code for area of living included in the survey. The number of
municipalities and city communities was reduced from about 2500 to 1037 in 1952.
24We cannot make income comparisons etc. for the three big cities since these cities all belong to
the same municipality and our available data is at the municipality level. However, parts of these
cities were allocated to the control group and part to the treatment.
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the experiment are on average somewhat larger than in the control group. We include
the municipality characteristics in the propensity score that balances the reform and
non-reform sample.
A ¯nal issue relates to the pre-reform years of compulsory education. Some munic-
ipalities before the reform had 7 years of compulsory schooling while some had 8. At
the start of the experiment in 1949 it was required that the participating municipal-
ities had 8 years of compulsory schooling. However this requirement was abandoned
after the ¯rst one or two years of the reform and only a®ected somewhere between 14
and 20 municipalities which corresponds to 2.3% of pupils allocated to the reform for
our cohort (see Table 12 in Appendix A).25 Moreover, survey data suggests that this is
not a major problem: The average number of years of schooling for those completing
level 1 only (the old compulsory school) in the non-reform areas for our cohort, is 7.8
years.26 Finally, although we cannot control for this potential problem directly,27 we
do know that municipalities with 7 years of schooling tended to be poorer and rural
municipalities or municipalities with low population. By matching on these character-
istics we should control for any remaining imbalances in pre-reform schooling between
the reform and non-reform samples.28
When imputing the average years of schooling for each level of education, we
have been slightly conservative by setting compulsory schooling to be 8 years for all.
Given the proportion of individuals at the old compulsory schooling (about 20%) this
potentially reduces slightly the average impact of the reform on schooling by about
two weeks at most.
25According to an educational scientist, Mac Murray, who has studied the experiment when it
was still evolving, the municipalities did not di®er systematically with respect to pre-reform years of
compulsory schooling.
26Source: Swedish Level of Living Survey, 1948 cohort.
27This would involve searching pre-1949 paper records for each of the old 2500 Swedish municipal-
ities. As we understand it, this is an almost impossible task.
28That is, we match on whether the municipality was rural or urban, population size, average
income and the local tax rate.
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In the experiment Control group
(n=4 084; 34.18%) (n=7 866; 65.82%)
Share living in
Stockholm, % 18.56 4.82
Share living in Gothen-
burg or Malmo, % 11.36 5.44
Share in cities (not Stockholm,
Gothemburg or Malmo), % 44.52 37.01
For cities other than Stockholm, Gothenburg and Malmo
Average population size 28646 33009
Mean income 49.57 47.13
Mean income tax, % 10.63 11.11
Share living in rural
municipalities, % 36.92 58.17
For rural municipalities
Average population size 7751 5750
Mean income 33.04 30.97
Mean income tax, % 10.56 9.48
Note: Characteristics of the city communities and municipalities obtained
from o±cial statistics on each area (Source: ºArsbok fÄor Sveriges kommuner
1960 and 1961)
Table 3: Comparison between treatment and control municipalities.
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6.2. The E®ect of the Reform on Education.
A change in the education system as radical as the 1950 reform could a®ect schooling
in a number of ways. There is a direct e®ect due to the increase in the amount of
compulsory schooling, potentially a®ecting about 25% of the individuals in the male
sub-sample and about 20% among the females. Then there is the set of measures
designed to facilitate the transition to higher education, including the abolition of
selection at 12 years of age.29 The curriculum in the level 3 (Upper secondary school 6
2 years) became more academic, making the transition to the Upper secondary school
easier. Finally, a means-tested stipend was introduced to \compensate" disadvantaged
families in the reform areas who had to send their children to school longer. The
means tested stipend was provided only up to the end of the new compulsory school
(see Appendix A for the amounts involved).
The reform may have also a®ected educational attainment through general equi-
librium e®ects Lang and Kropp (1986) for example ¯nd evidence that di®erences in
compulsory attendance laws in US states a®ect enrollment rates to education levels
not directly a®ected by the laws. The mechanism could operate through wages or
through a reduction in the signalling value of lower education levels (as the authors
argue). In the Swedish case these GE e®ects are likely to a®ect both reform and
non-reform areas in a similar way since a) the reform and non-reform municipalities
co-exist in the same labor market (i.e. the county) and b) the new system was ex-
pected to be implemented nationally. The e®ects we measure should be interpreted
as impacts on individuals given the aggregate impact of the experiment and given
the expectation that the reform would be implemented nationally, with a resulting
increase in educated workers, as we will now show.
Table 4 shows the share of individuals in the di®erent education levels by re-
form status and gender as well as the implied di®erence between the two. In the
29There is a sociological literature on how delayed streaming can a®ect educational choice educa-
tion, attenuating the e®ects of social background, (see e.g. Erikson and Jonsson, 1993).
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fourth column we report the results obtained by propensity score matching for each
education level. The propensity score30 used to balance the reform and non-reform
samples includes the county of schooling (which includes both reform and non-reform
municipalities),31 44 ability indicators, indicators of father's education and charac-
teristics of the municipality, including aggregate income, population size, the local
tax rate and whether it is a city, a rural community or other. We report 95% bias
corrected bootstrap con¯dence intervals and the standard deviation of the bootstrap.
In computing these we allow for the fact that the propensity score is estimated. As
suggested by the bootstrap theory (see Horowitz, 1999) we use the 95% con¯dence
intervals to judge whether an e®ect is signi¯cant. We also report the percentage of
matched observations in the reform sample as well as the average number of times
that an observation in the control sample was used.32
The largest impact of the reform was to shift those who would have stopped at
the old compulsory level (basic school) to the new compulsory level (comprehensive
school). For the matched sample the proportion stopping at education level 2 (which
pre-reform was the Junior secondary school and post reform constituted the new com-
prehensive school) increased by 10 percentage points for males and by 8 percentage
points for females. The importance of controlling for the observable di®erences in the
characteristics of those in the reform and those not is apparent when we compare this
result to the unmatched change, which is larger.
As can be seen from the table a small proportion of individuals assigned to the
reform completed the pre-reform basic school only, \evading" the increased compulsory
schooling level. These persons could havemoved out of the municipality included in the
30Probability of being assigned to the reform.
31A county is an administrative area containing a number of municipalities. There are 24 counties
in Sweden.
32In actual fact all observations were used in the estimation since we smooth before we match.
The total number of men and women in our sample is respectively The way report the numbers
in the table shows that there is no serious support problem between the reform and non-reform
municipalities. The median number of times that an observation in the control sample was used was
always one. However, a few observations were used quite frequently.
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experimental group after age 12 when the data on reform assignment was collected,
or they could have obtained an exemption from completing the extra compulsory
schooling. This highlights the importance of measuring the reform assignment, as we
do, before endogenous switching is likely to occur.
At the bottom of the Table we summarize the impact of the reform on post compre-
hensive education (levels 3 to 7), access to which the reform was intended to improve.
There we see that there is no signi¯cant overall increase in post-compulsory education
for men - rather there seems to have been some reallocation between types of post
compulsory education: For men we observe a marginally signi¯cant 1.7% point decline
in level 3 and an increase of 2.4 percentage points in level 5 (post upper secondary
· 2 years) which is consistent with the improved access provided by the reform to the
more academic types of education.
For females there is a 3.9% points increase in level 3 which is signi¯cant. In
contrast to men the reform seems to have caused an overall signi¯cant increase in post
compulsory schooling (levels 3-7) of 3% percentage points.
Finally, accounting for all changes implied by the reform male years of education
increased by 0.29 of a year and females years increased overall by 0.17 of a year.
As implied by the simple model we presented, the reform is likely to have had
di®erent impacts depending on individual ability and family background. In what fol-
lows, high ability individuals are de¯ned as those with the ¯rst principal component of
our 44 ability indicators above the median (see Appendix B for details). We associate
parental background with father's education and we de¯ne \low father's education"
as those individuals whose fathers completed only the statutory level of education
(also referred to as unskilled). The rest are referred to as \high father's education" or
skilled.
The results from the analysis by group is based again on propensity score matching
within each group including the same variables as before. These results are shown in
Table 5 for males and in Table 6 for females.
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Education level Males Females
Non-Reform Reform Change Change Non-Reform Reform Change Change
(Matched) (Matched)
1. Basic School 0.243 0.046 -0.197 -0.109 0.199 0.034 -0.165 -0.109
(0.007) (0.005) (0.011) (0.01) (0.006) (0.004) (0.009) (0.0102)
[-0.12,-0.096] [-0.12,-0.084]
2. Comprehensive/ 0.093 0.217 0.124 0.101 0.112 0.228 0.116 0.079
Junior Secondary (0.005) (0.009) (0.010) (0.013) (0.005) (0.009) (0.010) (0.015)
[0.07,0.12] [0.045,0.10]
3.Upper secondary 0.268 0.294 0.025 -0.017 0.349 0.357 0.008 0.039
school 6 2 years (0.007) (0.010) (0.012) (0.017) (0.008) (0.010) (0.013) (0.017)
[-0.047,0.006] [0.0071,0.070]
4. Upper Secondary 0.169 0.189 0.020 0.001 0.083 0.085 0.002 -0.016
school > 3 years (0.006) (0.009) (0.011) (0.015) (0.004) (0.006) (0.007) (0.012)
[-0.030,0.027] [-0.045,0.004]
5. Post Upper Secon- 0.070 0.082 0.013 0.024 0.119 0.134 0.015 -0.005
dary 6 2 years (0.004) (0.006) (0.007) (0.009) (0.005) (0.007) (0.009) (0.014)
[0.005,0.042] [-0.037,0.020]
6. University/College 0.147 0.161 0.014 0.00 0.134 0.159 0.026 0.0204
(0.006) (0.008) (0.010) (0.013) (0.005) (0.008) (0.009) (0.013)
[-0.024,0.023] [0.004,0.053]
7. Ph.D. 0.010 0.011 0.002 0.001 0.005 0.003 0.002 -0.009
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.005)
[-0.007,0.009] [-0.028,-0.001]
More than 0.664 0.737 0.073 0.009 0.689 0.738 0.0488 0.030
Comprehensive or (0.0077) (0.01) (0.013) (0.015) (0.0077) 0.0100) (0.0128) (0.018)
Junior Secondary [-0.018 0.030] [-0.001 0.066]
Years of educ. 11.14 11.84 0.70 0.29 11.16 11.77 0.61 0.17
(0.051) (0.062 (0.081) (0.100) (0.050) (0.061) (0.079) (0.11)
[0.006, 0.41] [-0.04, 0.39]
Sample size 5744 5540
Percent in reform 34% 35%
Percent matched 100% 100%
Average number of
times controls used 1.9 2
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Bias corrected 95% bootstrap con¯dence interval in square brackets.
Source: IS Survey, 1948 cohort.
Table 4: The impact of the reform on educational quali¯cations.
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Form men, the largest and most signi¯cant impact of the reform on educational
attainment is concentrated at the bottom of the education distribution for individuals
with unskilled parents (Table 5). Moreover, as expected the impact is largest for the
low ability individuals: Their optimal level of education is likely to be lower and hence
there is a higher concentration of them at the old compulsory school in the absence
of the reform. In terms of years of education, for the children of unskilled parents the
implied increase for those with low ability is 0.45 of a year and for those with high
ability 0.21. Comparing the high ability individuals in the two parental education
groups we see a signi¯cant shift from the old to the new compulsory schooling level
for the children of the unskilled parents and no such impact for the children of high
education parents of similar ability.
When we compare those with low ability in the two parental education groups again
the impact is larger for the children of the unskilled parents. In terms of increases
in post compulsory schooling, there is an increase of 4.6 percentage points for the
low ability children of unskilled parents. The e®ect points to a relative success of the
policy of removing early selection, as far as educational attainment is concerned, but
is not very precisely estimated. Finally for the children of skilled parents with high
ability there is a decline in level 4 and an increase in University attendance (level 6).
This gives rise to a large but very imprecisely (and insigni¯cant) estimated increase
in the years of education for this group.
For women the impact of the reform is very high at the bottom of the distribution
for those with low ability and unskilled fathers. The impact for high ability women
(whether with unskilled fathers or skilled ones) is small and insigni¯cant around the
new compulsory schooling level (level 2 - comprehensive). However, in line with the
aims of the reform, there is a signi¯cant increase in post compulsory schooling for the
high ability women with unskilled parents of the order of 4%. Overall it all adds up to
the same impact for the years of education for the two groups (about 0.26 and 0.29 of
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Father's education Low Low High High
Ability High Low High Low
Education level
1. Basic School -0.088 -0.199 -0.002 -0.018
(0.016) (0.020) (0.008) (0.023)
[-0.12,-0.06] [-0.23,-0.14] [-0.057,0.0] [-0.11,0.015]
2. Comprehensive/ 0.062 0.153 0.013 0.098
Junior Secondary (0.021) (0.023) (0.021) (0.042)
[0.02,0.11] [0.10,0.19] [-0.028,0.050] [-0.004,0.17]
3. Upper Secondary -0.007 0.003 -0.002 -0.032
school 6 2 years (0.027) (0.028) (0.033) (0.073)
[-0.09,0.03] [-0.057,0.053] [-0.062,0.05] [-0.16,0.10]
4. Upper Secondary 0.030 0.017 -0.17 -0.12
school> 3 years (0.025) (0.020) (0.073) (0.077)
[-0.014,0.077] [-0.021,0.059] [-0.32,-0.021] [-0.32,-0.018]
5. Post Upper Secon- 0.017 0.014 -0.004 0.046
dary 6 2 years (0.018) (0.021) (0.053) (0.053)
[-0.020, 0.05] [-0.012, 0.042] [-0.16, 0.08] [-0.066, 0.14]
6.University/College -0.022 0.014 0.12 0.026
(0.023) (0.011) (0.081) (0.067)
[-0.062,0.25] [-0.012, 0.033] [-0.08, 0.26] [-0.12, 0.14]
7. Ph.D. 0.008 -0.001 0.029 0
(0.006) (0.002) (0.030) (0.013)
[-0.004, 0.021] [-0.009, 0] [-0.03, 0.09] [-0.009, 0.03]
More than Comprehensive/ 0.026 0.046 -0.011 -0.080
Junior Secondary (0.026) (0.028) (0.023) (0.043)
[-0.036, 0.07] [-0.012, 0.095] [-0.048, 0.036] [-0.16, 0.016]
Years of Education 0.21 0.45 0.69 -0.048
(0.18) (0.13) (0.37) (0.4)
[-0.11,0.61] [0.09,0.64] [-0.12,1.3] [-0.76, 0.76]
Sample Size 2421 2479 611 233
Percent in reform 33% 33% 38% 43%
Percent matched 97% 91% 92% 94%
Average times controls used 1.94 1.94 2.1 2.2
Notes: Standard deviation of the bootstrap in round brackets. Bias corrected 95 % bootstrap
con¯dence interval in square brackets.
Source: IS Survey, 1948 cohort.
Table 5: The impact of the reform on educational quali¯cations by father's education
and ability. Males.
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a year respectively). An interesting result is the large increase in level 3 for women of
low ability with skilled parents. The bootstrap con¯dence intervals indicates that it
is very robust, although the sample size is quite small. This positive e®ect also shows
up in the overall sample as seen in Table 4. As we noted above these ripple or \knock
on e®ects" probably re°ect the impact of the abolition of early selection in the reform
municipalities.
To summarize, the results show a signi¯cant impact of the reform at the bottom end
of the education distribution for children from low skilled parents and in particular for
the lower ability ones. The reform also a®ected the level of post compulsory schooling
and in particular for high ability women with unskilled parents. Although the reform
did increase educational attainment for high ability men of unskilled parents the most
pronounced e®ects for men are among the low ability ones. Thus the results highlight
the importance of both ability and parental background. While the former re°ects
the fact that lower ability persons have less to gain (relative to opportunity costs) by
more education, the importance of parental background, even for high ability people
may be an indication of informational or ¯nancial constraints for this group. We no
turn to the impact of the reform on earnings.
6.3. The e®ect of the Reform on Earnings
In Table 7 we present estimates of the impact of the reform on log-earnings for both
men and women, based on propensity score matching. We also present the standard
deviation of the bootstrap and bias corrected 95% bootstrap con¯dence intervals.
Our ¯rst estimates relate to the entire sample and they represent the average e®ect
on log real earnings over the 12 years of earnings data for those who went through the
reform system. The individuals were aged between 37 in 1985 and 58 in 1996.33 These
results show positive e®ects for both men (1.1%) and women (3.3%). The e®ect for
men is insigni¯cant while for women it is signi¯cant at the 10% signi¯cance level.
33We have excluded the individuals who did not have any earnings for the whole year.
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Father's education Low Low High High
Ability High Low High Low
Education level
1. Basic School -0.042 -0.212 -0.001 -0.02
(0.011) (0.023) (0.002) (0.027)
[-0.06,-0.018] [-0.25,-0.17] [-0.009,0.0] [-0.088,-0.001]
2. Comprehensive/ 0.002 0.187 0.044 -0.01
Junior Secondary (0.024) (0.026) (0.027) (0.072)
[-0.08,0.037] [0.14,0.24] [-0.013,0.094] [-0.08,0.08]
3. Upper Secondary 0.030 0.019 -0.084 0.27
school 6 2 years (0.025) (0.030) (0.048) (0.077)
[-0.007,0.081] [-0.03,0.08] [-0.21,-0.020] [0.12,0.43]
4. Upper Secondary -0.040 0.016 -0.039 -0.095
school > 3 years (0.020) (0.012) (0.061) (0.06)
[-0.084,0.007] [-0.014,0.037] [-0.14,0.092] [-0.24,-0.03]
5. Post Upper Secon- 0.0 -0.009 0.022 -0.086
dary 6 2 years (0.023) (0.021) (0.066) (0.079)
[-0.048,0.041] [-0.056,0.024] [-0.13,0.13] [-0.29,0.011]
6.University/College 0.058 0.00 0.069 -0.051
(0.022) (0.01) (0.084) (0.073)
[0.0191,0.103] [-0.022,0.016] [-0.078,0.24] [-0.21,0.085]
7. Ph.D. -0.012 0 -0.012 -
(0.006) (0.028) -
[-0.034,-0.003] [-0.07,0.034]
More than Comprhensive/ 0.039 0.025 -0.044 0.033
Junior Secondary (0.024) (0.030) (0.078) (0.073)
[0.0004, 0.11] [-0.027 0.079] [-0.09 0.013] [-0.064 0.089]
Years of Education 0.29 0.26 0.17 -0.60
(0.17) (0.14) (0.41) (0.51)
[-0.06, 0.64] [-0.049, 0.51] [-0.49,1.1] [-1.1,0.86]
Sample Size 2338 2408 575 219
Reform observations used 33% 35% 38% 44%
Percent matched 100% 94% 98% 93%
Average times controls used 2 1.9 1.7 2.3
Notes: Standard deviation of the bootstrap in round brackets. Bias corrected 95 % bootstrap
con¯dence interval in square brackets.
Source: IS Survey, 1948 cohort.
Table 6: The impact of the reform on educational quali¯cations by father's education
and ability. Females.
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The low estimated e®ect overall is not that surprising at this aggregate level since
the main impacts of the reform were on the educational achievement of individuals
from unskilled parents. Thus we repeat the matching exercise for the di®erent sub-
groups based on ability and father's education as before.
The results are presented in Table 7. We ¯nd that the highest e®ects of the
reform on earnings are among those with unskilled fathers and high ability. Within
the low parental education group, for high ability men the estimated impact is nearly
four times that of the low ability men. For high ability women the impact of the
reform is nearly twice that of the low ability women. This is consistent with the idea
that high ability individuals, who were induced to have more education under the
reform, had faced barriers in the old system. Under the reform system they obtained
more education and bene¯ted from it. Recall that the reform acted through increases
in compulsory schooling, through the abolition of selection, and was accompanied
by a means tested stipend for those in the reform municipalities. This is important
because it reduced the incentive to ¯nd ways of avoiding compulsory schooling by, say,
switching municipality and it may have helped ¯nance the post-compulsory increases
in schooling that we observed.
It is unclear how the reform could have a®ected those with skilled parents, since
there is no ¯rm evidence that it a®ected much their educational outcomes. The other
channels would have been the removal of streaming (tracking) or other more subtle
changes that may have taken place. The removal of streaming and early selection
allowed lower achieving children to mixwith potentially higher achieving ones, possibly
reducing the performance of the latter. Unfortunately we cannot provide conclusive
evidence of such an e®ect. Although the point estimates for individuals with highly
educated fathers are negative, the results are far too imprecise, based on the bootstrap
con¯dence interval, to make any inference.
In conclusion, there is ¯rm evidence that the reform had a positive impact on the
earnings of those from poorer backgrounds with high ability. The results for men
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and women are similar. However the impact on female earnings seems to have been
somewhat higher overall.
Males Females
All 0.0113 0.033
(0.018) (0.025)
[-0.025 0.046] [-0.008 0.092]
Low Fathers Education 0.0164 0.0338
Low Ability (0.027) (0.027)
[-0.038 0.071] [-0.01 0.0.091]
Low Fathers Education 0.0605 0.0597
High Ability (0.034) (0.037)
[0.013 0.150] [-0.01 0.140]
High Fathers Education -0.0640 -0.043
Low Ability (0.105) (0.12)
[-0.29 0.10] [-0.21 0.11]
High Fathers Education -0.0880 -0.038
High Ability (0.105) (0.085)
[-0.30 0.17] [-0.20 0.14]
Note: Results obtained by propensity score matching
Standard deviation of the bootstrap in round brackets. Bias
corrected 95% bootstrap con¯dence interval in square brackets.
Table 7: The impact of the reform on Earnings.
6.4. The E®ect of Education on Earnings
We now turn to the estimation of the returns to education. Apart from the direct in-
terest in measuring the returns to education we are also able to investigate whether the
reform acted exclusively through the impact on the quantity of education or whether
it had a direct impact as well. Finally, we are able to investigate whether the returns
to education vary by ability.
We present both OLS and IV results. All regressions use log annual earnings as
the dependent variable and include time dummies, the county of schooling and the
county of residence. In all cases we include the complete set of ability indicators
except for the ¯rst OLS regression for men and women where we exclude them. In
all cases we present asymptotic standard errors that are robust for heteroskedasticity
and arbitrary serial correlation.
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The OLS results are interesting in themselves since it is quite possible that edu-
cation can be taken as exogenous, given the large set of observable ability indicators
and parental background variables. This would require that individuals do not self-
select on the basis of their unobserved returns to education when choosing education
choice (possibly because they do not know them at that time). It also requires that
unobserved earnings ability is mean independent of education choice given observable
characteristics.
The OLS results are presented in Table 8 for males and in Table 9 for females. In
the upper panels of Tables 8 and 9 we present OLS results pooled over all parental
background groups. In the ¯rst column, where we exclude the ability variables the
returns to years of education are estimated at 6.4% annually for men and 5.2% for
women. When we control for ability the male returns drop to 5.4% and female returns
drop to 4%. Finally when we allow the returns to vary by ability we ¯nd that the
returns to the low ability men are 4.3% and 3.5% for low ability women, while for the
high ability men these are as high as 6% conditional on observed ability. For high
ability women the OLS returns are 4.3%. In the last three columns of Tables 8 and 9
we include the reform indicator which turns out to be insigni¯cant in all cases.
In the lower panels of Tables 8 and 9 we estimate the returns to education, using
OLS, separately by father's education and by ability group. The results are very
similar to the previous ones with one notable exception: The reform indicator has a
positive and marginally signi¯cant impact on the earnings of high ability men with
unskilled parents. This is an interesting result since this subpopulation would have
bene¯ted potentially by the switch to a comprehensive system (which would improve
the peer group for them) and by the more academic curriculum. Unfortunately we
will not be able to con¯rm these results using IV, since for this group there are no
di®erential e®ects of the reform on education across municipalities. Interestingly the
point estimates for the reform dummy for the children in the higher parental education
group are negative. This could indicate that children from better o® backgrounds were
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Men - Ordinary Least Squares
All Parental Educations
No Ability All Abilities Low Ability High Ability All Abilities Low Ability High Ability
Years of schooling 0.064 0.054 0.043 0.060 0.053 0.043 0.060
(0.0025) (0.0032) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004)
Reform 0.021 0.011 0.036
(0.018) (0.026) (0.026)
Obs. (N £T) 58912 58912 28604 30308 58912 28604 30308
Heteroskedasticity and serial correlation robust asymptotic standard errors in parentheses.
Men - Ordinary Least Squares
Low Father's Education High Father's Education
Low Ability High Ability Low Ability High Ability Low Ability High Ability Low Ability High Ability
Years of 0.042 0.058 0.041 0.058 0.051 0.051 0.050 0.052
schooling (0.006) (0.0046) (0.006) (0.005) (0.015) (0.007) (0.015) (0.007)
Reform 0.019 0.057 -0.052 -0.054
(0.028) (0.030) (0.085) (0.043)
Obs. 26318 23755 26318 23755 2357 6609 2357 6609
(N£T )
Heteroskedasticity and serial correlation asymptotic standard errors in parentheses. All regressions include ability variables.
Table 8: OLS estimates of the returns to years of education. Men.
harmed by the other aspects of the reform, such as the abolition of tracking by ability;
nevertheless the e®ect is insigni¯cant.
As is well understood, the OLS results may su®er from selection/endogeneity bias
since education choices may be correlated with unobserved ability. We use the educa-
tion changes induced by the reform to estimate the returns to education which in this
case are interpretable as LATE e®ects as discussed earlier in the paper.
In Table 10 we present the estimates for males. The excluded instruments are the
interactions of the reform with the county of schooling as well as parental education
(low/high). County of schooling dummies are included in the regression. In the ¯rst
three columns of the top panel and the ¯rst two of the lower panel we also exclude
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Women - Ordinary Least Squares
All Parental Educations
No Ability All Abilities Low Ability High Ability All Abilities Low Ability High Ability
Years of schooling 0.052 0.040 0.035 0.043 0.040 0.035 0.043
(0.002) (0.0024) (0.0036) (0.0032) (0.0024) (0.0036) (0.0032)
Reform 0.006 0.0037 0.011
(0.015) (0.020) (0.021)
Obs. (N £T) 56178 56178 27493 28685 56178 27493 28685
Heteroskedasticity and serial correlation robust asymptotic standard errors in parentheses.
Women - Ordinary Least Squares
Low Father's Education High Father's Education
Low Ability High Ability Low Ability High Ability Low Ability High Ability Low Ability High Ability
Years of 0.037 0.041 0.037 0.041 0.056 0.049 0.056 0.049
schooling (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.018) (0.009) (0.018) (0.009)
Reform 0.006 0.023 0.01 -0.023
(0.022) (0.024) (0.098) (0.046)
Obs. 25206 22712 25206 22712 2303 5997 2303 5997
(N £T)
Heteroskedasticity and serial correlation robust asymptotic standard errors in parentheses.
Table 9: OLS estimates of the returns to years of education. Women.
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the reform indicator itself. In the lower panel of Table 10 we estimate the model using
IV on the sample of people with unskilled parents, thus relaxing the assumption that
parental education can be excluded. In the last two columns of that Table we also
include the reform indicator as a regressor, providing the least restricted estimates.
The results in Table 10 imply that the IV returns to education on wages are twice
as high for the high ability people. This remains true when we control for the reform
indicator which is insigni¯cant and very small. When we estimate the model using the
children of unskilled parents only (lower panel of Table 10) we obtain a similar picture
except that the returns for higher ability men are now lower (5.2% versus 7.3%). Note
however, that for the high ability people the instrument is rather weak in the reduced
form for education with a p-value of 7.5%. Since the reform had little or no signi¯cant
impact on the educational attainment of the individuals with skilled parents we do
not present IV results for that group separately.34
Recalling the interpretation of IV as a LATE parameter, note that this parameter
is not generally invariant to the instrument used, even when the instrument is indepen-
dent of the unobservables. Thus when we use parental background as an instrument,35
in conjunction with the reform indicator, the return we estimate is a weighted average
of the returns for those individuals who acquired extra schooling because their parents
were more skilled (and who would otherwise have obtained less schooling) and of the
returns for those induced into higher levels of education due to the reform. These
returns may or may not be the same. The point estimates indicate that they may not
be, although the di®erences are not signi¯cant.
When we include the reform indicator in the regression and using as instruments
the interactions of the reform indicator with the county of schooling the point estimates
indicate a positive e®ect of the reform and an even lower return to education. However,
the lack of precision prevents us from drawing any ¯rm conclusions. This is despite
34See Bound, Jaeger an Baker (1995) and Staiger and Stock (1997) on the importance of using
instruments with signi¯cant explanatory power.
35Even assuming that it is conditionally independent of the unobservabls in the earnings equation.
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Men - Instrumental Variables
All Parental Educations
All Abilities Low Ability High Ability All Abilities Low Ability High Ability
Years of schooling 0.065 0.037 0.073 0.065 0.036 0.072
(0.009) (0.015) (0.011) (0.009) (0.017) (0.011)
Reform -0.002 0.002 0.009
(0.014) (0.022) (0.020)
P-value - exlusions 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
in the reduced form
Obs. (N£T) 58912 28604 30308 58912 28604 30308
Heteroskedasticity and serial correlation robust asymptotic standard errors in parentheses.
Included regressors: County of residence,county of schooling, year dummies and ability indicators.
Excluded Instruments: Reform (¯rst three columns), parental education, interactions of reform with county of schooling.
Men - Instrumental Variables
Low Father's Education
Low Ability High Ability Low Ability High Ability
Years of schooling 0.034 0.052 0.018
(0.023) (0.030) (0.033)
Reform 0.021
(0.030)
P-value for 0.0 0.075 0.033 0.19
exluded instruments
Obs. (N £ T) 26318 23755 26318 23755
Heteroskedasticity and serial correlation robust asymptotic standard errors
in parentheses. Included regressors: County of residence,
county of schooling, year dummies and ability indicators. Excluded
Instruments: Reform (¯rst two columns) and interactions of reform with county
of schooling.
Table 10: IV estimates of the returns to years of education. Men.
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the fact that the excluded instruments are very signi¯cant in the reduced form. We do
not report the results on the high ability individuals since the excluded instruments
had little explanatory power (p-value 0.19).36
The IV results are generally lower than the OLS ones for the lower ability persons
and higher for the higher ability ones. Nevertheless, the di®erences between OLS and
IV estimates are not signi¯cant.
Turning now to the results for women, which are presented in Table 11, the overall
picture is the same, except when we condition on the individual having an unskilled
father, in which case the returns become much higher. The results, in the lower
panel of Table 11 imply that the returns for high ability women, induced into more
schooling because of the reform, are nearly twice as high as the returns for low ability
women induced into more schooling. Moreover, the returns are higher than the returns
obtained using OLS.
As shown in the lower panel of Table 11, for both ability groups the direct impact
of the reform is small and insigni¯cant. Moreover, the estimated returns to education
remain una®ected by the inclusion of the reform indicator for the low ability people.
Again for the high ability people this is not identi¯ed, with the instruments having a
0.57 p-value in the reduced form.
Thus to summarize, when we use parental background as an instrument as well as
the reform assignment, we ¯nd that the reform had no direct in°uence on earnings
other than the impact it had through the increase in the quantity of education. When
we look at the outcomes for children whose parents were unskilled, we reach the same
conclusion, although with less precision. However, we have not been able to identify
returns to education and reform e®ects separately for children with high ability and
unskilled parents or for children from skilled parents. The switch to a comprehensive
system could have had an e®ect on their performance, but we can o®er no evidence
36This is because there were no signi¯cant di®erences in the impact of the reform across counties
for these individuals.
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Women - Instrumental Variables
All Parental Educations
All Abilities Low Ability High Ability All Abilities Low Ability High Ability
Years of schooling 0.043 0.027 0.054 0.042 0.023 0.054
(0.010) (0.015) (0.013) (0.011) (0.016) (0.014)
Reform 0.006 0.024 -0.005
(0.014) (0.022) (0.020)
P-value for 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
exluded instruments
Obs. (N£T) 56178 27493 28685 56178 27493 28685
Heteroskedasticity and serial correlation robust asymptotic standard errors in parentheses in parentheses.
Included regressors: County of residence,county of schooling of schooling, year dummies and ability indicators.
Excluded Instruments: Reform (¯rst three columns), parental education, interactions of reform with county of schooling.
Women - Instrumental Variables
Low Father's Education
Low Ability High Ability Low Ability High Ability
Years of schooling 0.058 0.091 0.049
(0.025) (0.033) (0.033)
Reform 0.013
(0.027)
P-value for 0.0 0.039 0.048 0.57
exluded instruments
Obs. (N £ T) 25206 22712 25206 22712
Heteroskedasticity and serial correlation robust asymptotic standard
errors in parentheses. Included regressors: County of residence, county of schooling
of schooling, year dummies and ability indicators. Excluded Instruments:
Reform (¯rst two columns) and interactions of reform with county of schooling.
Table 11: IV estimates of the returns to years of education. Women.
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on that other than when we pool the children from di®erent parental backgrounds.
We compare the returns to education for high and low ability individuals. This
is possible either when we exclude parental education from wages and use it as an
instrument or alternatively when we assume that the e®ect of the reform only went
through the quantity of education. In this case the estimated LATE e®ect of education
on wages is higher for the high ability persons with both the alternative instrument
sets.37 This is true for both men and women and suggests that the high ability children
of unskilled parents bene¯ted a great deal from the positive impact of the reform on
educational attainment, and probably faced barriers to education before the reform.
Finally, in all IV regressions we include ability variables, county of residence and
county of schooling. However, in the results we present we do not include the mu-
nicipality characteristics (either as regressors or as instruments), as we did in the
matching section. When we did this the results in which we use parental education as
an instrument remain una®ected. Moreover all the results for women that we report
also do not change. However the IV results for men with unskilled parents become
very imprecise. In this sense the results on the returns to education for women are
more robust than those for men.
7. Conclusions
In this paper we evaluate the impact of a major reform to the Swedish education
system. This reform had a number of elements that have either been implemented
or are being discussed in many countries. It increased compulsory schooling and
introduced a comprehensive school system that was not based on selection by ability
into di®erent streams (tracking), as the old system was. Finally, it introduced means
tested subsidies for education. The reform was preceded by a unique social experiment
where the new comprehensive school was implemented in a number of municipalities
at the same time as other municipalities were still operating the old system. Thus
we are in the unique position to evaluate a reform of broad interest using exceptional
37Including and excluding parental background in wages.
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data.
We consider the impact of the reform on educational achievement and on earn-
ings. We ¯nd that the reform raised the overall educational achievement The e®ect
was concentrated on those whose father was unskilled and mainly towards the lower
part of the education distribution. Nevertheless we do ¯nd evidence that the reform
increased educational attainment beyond the new compulsory schooling level, point-
ing to positive impacts of improving access to higher education levels by abolishing
early selection. Within that group most of the impact was on those with lower ability.
However when we look at earnings we ¯nd that the largest impact of the reform by
far, is on the higher ability men and women, with unskilled fathers. The impact on
the lower ability men and women is much smaller.
In the subsequent part of the paper we use the assignment to the reform as an
instrument for education in an earnings equation. We argue that reform assignment is
a valid instrument, particularly given the large array of characteristics that we observe.
We interpret the returns we estimate as the impact of extra education for those induced
to it due to the reform (LATE). We show that these returns to education are higher
for the high ability individuals, for both men and women. We also present evidence
that the reform a®ected earnings only through the increased quantity of education
and not directly, at least for some groups as well as on average for the whole a®ected
population. However, we have no evidence (other than from OLS) on this, speci¯cally
for the children of skilled parents.
Whether the estimated impacts of the reform justify the costs cannot be evaluated
from our data. A full cost-bene¯t analysis of the Swedish education would be a worth-
while exercise. However, in this paper we show that the reform entailed substantial
gains for children from poorer backgrounds.
Appendix A. The 1950 Education Reform
A1. Background to the Reform
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The motivation for the reform was partly to catch up with countries such as the
US where high school enrolment was above 80% in the 1940s (see Goldin, 1999) and
partly to respond to the increased demand for resources in education. The share of
students who joined junior secondary school increased from about 10 percent in 1930
to about 40 percent in 1950 (see Erikson & Jonsson, 1993).
The main controversy in the political debate preceding the reform was between
those in favor of a comprehensive school and those who wanted to maintain parallel
school systems with a vocational and academic track, based on early selection. A
comprehensive school was seen as more \democratic" (see e.g. Paulston, 1968, or
Myrdal, 1939) and the expansion of the US high school system was used as a model.
The old system, however, was seen by some as providing better preparation for higher
education.
The school committee's proposal in 1948 was to replace the old compulsory and
junior secondary school with a nine year compulsory comprehensive school. The com-
promise for those who wanted to maintain the parallel school systems was that the
students were able to choose between three di®erent levels after sixth grade: one with
a more academic curriculum, one general level and one level which included voca-
tional training. The new comprehensive system was to use teachers who specialized
in particular areas.
The reform prolonged compulsory schooling to nine years. There was a centrally
decided curriculum for all schools, which di®ered from the pre-reform compulsory
schools where the curriculum was decided by the municipalities.
A2. The Evolution of the Experiment
The nation wide experiment with the new comprehensive school started in 1949
and continued until 1962. In the experiment, the proposed comprehensive school
was implemented in entire municipalities or parts of city communities, rather than
in separate schools or classes. In some cases, the reform was implemented for the
incoming 1st grade cohort of students only, while in others it was implemented for
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students in the ¯fth grade at the date of assignment. No pupil was switched system
after the 5th grade: If they started in the old system they would complete schooling
under the rules of the old system.
Municipalities were selected by a committee to implement the reform from a pool
of applicants. In the ¯rst one or two years of the experiment (i.e. 1949) the 14 se-
lected municipalities ful l¯led two main requirements: (1) The length of the compulsory
schooling was 8 rather than 7 years in the municipality. (2) The demographic structure
of the municipality permitted a continuous °ow of pupils into the new school system.
These requirements were abandoned after the ¯rst one or two years allowing all types
of municipalities to be assigned to the reform. We discuss this issue further at the
end of section 6.1. Moreover the regrouping of the municipalities in 1952 from about
2500 to 1037 made the second requirement probably irrelevant. Finally it should be
noted that many municipalities were being rejected by the committee,38 which was
always attempting to obtain a representative sample. Table 12 shows the development
of take-up of the experiment between 1949 and 1962.
A3. Reform Implementation and Financial Incentives for Pupils
Those running the experiment recognized that the increase in compulsory schooling
would lead to potentially serious ¯nancial burdens on lower income families. Thus a
non-taxable universal child allowance of 260 SEK per year and per child (less than
16) was introduced in 1948.39 This allowance was increased to 400 SEK by the end
of the experiment. Second, in 1953, when the ¯rst cohort included in the experiment
reached 9th grade, means tested stipends were introduced, based on family income.
The maximum amount of these stipends were 75 SEK per month in 9th grade and
somewhat lower in 8th grade.
A4. Pupil Compliance
38For evidence on this up to 1957 See FÄorsÄoksverksamhet med nioºarig skolplikt, 1959.
39To get a sense of the importance of these amounts, in 1948 the average annual gross earnings for
a male worker amounted to 5,892 SEK and 3,883 for a female worker (Statistisk ºArsbok fÄor Sverige,
1950).
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Year Municipalities Number of Number of
Cumulative Number Percentage share classes students
1949/50 14 1.3 172 2 483
1950/51 20 1.9 379 7 529
1951/52 25 2.4 682 14 635
1952/53 30 2.9 1 009 22 725
1953/54 37 3.5 1 525 35 784
1954/55 46 4.4 2 516 61 498
1955/56 59 5.6 3 394 84 941
1956/57 71 6.7 4 393 109 694
1957/58 96 9.1 5 702 143 370
1958/59 142 13.5 8 036 196 343
1959/60 217 20.6 11 191 266 042
1960/61 295 28.0 14 283 333 094
1961/62 415 39.4 18 665 436 595
Note: The 1952 division of municipalities (total: 1 052). Source:
Marklund (1981).
Table 12: Quantitative development of the comprehensive school experiment 1949 to
1962. The row relevant for the year of the survey (1960/61) for the data used in our
main emirical analysis is marked with bold.
We now consider two forms of non-compliance. Due to the nature of the data,
neither compromises the evaluation, as we explain below.
It was possible to obtain an exemption from the prolonged compulsory school
after 8th grade for special reasons. This will be apparent in our data when even in
the reform areas some children left school after eight years. The 1957 evaluation of
the experiment showed that about 7.5 percent in 1957 and about 4.5 percent in 1958
used that possibility and quit after 8th grade.40
An alternative form of non-compliance was to move municipalities. This was con-
sidered to be a problem in the 1957 evaluation at the early phase of the experiment;
in particular up to 20% of pupils who wanted to continue with a selective schooling
were thought to switch municipalities after 6th grade.41 However, there is little in-
dication of this based on the number of pupils progressing from sixth grade to the
40see page 52 in FÄorsÄoksverksamhet med nioºarig skolplikt, 1959
41See page 235 in FÄorsÄoksverksamhet med nioºarig skolplikt, 1959
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comprehensive schools in the reform areas for the later part of the experiment, which
concerns our cohort, when the new system had become more prevalent (see Pupils in
Compulsory Schools in Sweden 1847-1962, 1974).
Neither of these compliance problems seriously a®ects our ability to evaluate the
reform: We observe the municipality of schooling at sixth grade, i.e., before the pupils
are split up under the old (pre reform) system and while still under the compulsory
schooling restrictions of the old system. For switches of municipality to a®ect the
exogeneity of reform assignment (conditional on the observables) they would have to
take place before the 6th grade. This is much less likely, since the pupils would have
little to gain by an early switch. Moreover the o±cial statistics does not show any
such evidence of switching.
A5. Incentives for the Municipalities to Implement the Comprehen-
sive School in the Experiment
A potential source of di®erences between areas where the reform was implemented
and those where it was not, is likely to be the element of self-selection of municipalities
who accepted the implementation of the reform. One issue is whether municipalities
viewed it as costly to implement. Implementing the new comprehensive school did
involve costs for the municipality. Extending the compulsory schooling required new
school buildings as well as hiring new teachers. In addition to that, the more spe-
cialized teachers on the last three years of the comprehensive school required a lower
teaching load than the teachers in the pre-reform compulsory schools.
The initial invitation to participate was accompanied by a promise that all extra
costs would be covered by the central government. However, after a few years, the
municipalities who implemented the new school claimed that they actually bore ad-
ditional costs although they received some support from the central government. The
National school board investigated how the municipal income tax rate earmarked for
expenditures for basic education changed in all municipalities between 1946 and 1951.
It was found out that the tax rate remained constant at 2.56% up until 1949 and then
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increased to 2.85% in the municipalities which did not implement the comprehensive
schools. In the municipalities that implemented the reform, the tax rate increased
slightly from on average 2.18% in 1946 to 2.35% in 1949, but markedly to 3.25 in
1951.42
In 1953 a new system for ¯nancial support for the municipalities who implemented
the reform was introduced. In short, this system implied that 100 percent of the
wage costs for specialized teachers were covered by the state. The municipalities also
obtained a special allowance to cover housing costs for these teachers. In addition to
that, the state subsidized new school buildings by 8 percent and a system to cover
additional costs for teaching materials and transports of pupils were implemented.
In 1958, and until the end of the experiment in 1962, this system was replaced by
a general state subsidy tied to the number of teachers in compulsory schools and a
special allowance, paid to the municipality, of 80 SEK for each pupil in the last three
years in the comprehensive schools to cover additional costs for teaching materials.
To summarize, there was a net subsidy from the central government to the included
municipalities throughout the experiment, although not all additional costs were cov-
ered by the government. It can be hypothesized that municipalities who under the
pre-reform regime wanted a Junior secondary school but did not have one, or wanted
to expand this type of schooling, gained most by joining the experiment.
Appendix B. The IS Data
The IS survey consists of information from four main sources:
(1) Student's social background and socio-economic situation. The information
from this block of the data-set is obtained directly from the respondent through the
survey questionnaire. The variables measuring mother's and father's education are
grouped into four levels: Basic education (\folkskola"), Junior secondary school (\re-
alskola/°ickskola"), Upper secondary school (\gymnasium") and Academic education.
(2) Results from IQ and achievement tests. The IS surveys contains results from
42FÄorsÄoksverksamhet med nioºarig skolplikt, 1959, page 40.
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Variable/PC Abil1 Abil2 Abil3 Variable/PC Abil1 Abil2 Abil3
Indicator Variable for score in Mathematics IQ test Grade in Mathematics
MIQ1 -0.150 -0.006 0.085 IMG1 -0.113 0.116 0.193
MIQ2 -0.122 -0.053 0.008 IMG2 -0.276 0.171 0.122
MIQ3 -0.068 -0.060 0.013 IMG3 -0.081 -0.149 -0.326
MIQ4 -0.033 -0.086 -0.023 IMG4 0.240 -0.150 0.041
MIQ5 0.035 -0.124 -0.003 IMG5 0.253 0.138 0.131
MIQ6 0.055 -0.095 0.004 IMG6 0.046 0.062 -0.011
MIQ7 0.109 -0.102 0.042 Grade in English
MIQ8 0.139 -0.051 0.101 EG1 -0.117 0.132 0.235
MIQ9 0.176 0.411 -0.260 EG2 -0.285 0.184 0.100
Indicator variable for score in verbal IQ test EG3 -0.054 -0.214 -0.410
VIQ1 -0.168 0.013 0.117 EG4 0.297 -0.113 0.146
VIQ2 -0.145 -0.064 -0.022 EG5 0.213 0.134 0.120
VIQ3 -0.061 -0.089 -0.044 EG6 0.023 0.039 -0.011
VIQ4 -0.021 -0.084 -0.057 Grade in Swedish
VIQ5 0.027 -0.129 -0.029 SG2 -0.213 0.229 0.341
VIQ6 0.064 -0.119 0.022 SG3 -0.263 -0.041 -0.362
VIQ7 0.108 -0.092 0.054 SG4 0.267 -0.230 0.015
VIQ8 0.157 -0.050 0.138 SG5 0.259 0.142 0.146
VIQ9 0.193 0.411 -0.231 SG6 0.029 0.042 -0.007
Indicator variable for score in spatial IQ test Variance/total variance in % 8.62 6.19 4.60
SIQ1 -0.129 0.411 0.066
SIQ2 -0.069 -0.035 0.019
SIQ3 -0.033 -0.068 0.048
SIQ4 -0.001 -0.078 0.029
SIQ5 0.017 -0.069 0.047
SIQ6 0.040 -0.064 0.030
SIQ7 0.057 -0.069 0.025
SIQ8 0.098 -0.039 0.038
SIQ9 0.131 0.398 -0.298
Table 13: Loadings for principal components Abil, Abil2 and Abil3.
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two types of tests: (a) Results from three di®erent types of IQ tests; (b) Results from
test on achievement in di®erent subjects taught in school.
(a) IQ tests. The three di®erent IQ tests measure three di®erent aspects of intellec-
tual ability. First, the verbal ability is measured by the test Opposite (The respondent
is asked to choose the opposite of a word from four given choices). Second, the spa-
tial ability is measured with the test Metal folding (The respondent is asked to choose
which three dimensional object from four given alternatives that can be obtained from
a given °at piece of metal). Third, the mathematical ability is measured through the
test Number series (The respondent is asked to complete a given series of numbers).
(b) Achievement tests. The ability in reading, writing, English, and mathematics,
all subjects taught in the compulsory school, are measured by standardized tests.
All test scores were collected in 6th grade, i.e. for most children before the impact
of the streaming in the pre-reform school system had any e®ect.
(3) Register information on the students performance and type of school. Data on
grades were obtained by matching the samples with a national register provided by
the National School Board. In the pre-reform grade system the grades were set in
seven levels, while the post-reform school applied a ¯ve level scheme. These grading
schemes were made comparable by transforming the highest and lowest two levels in
the pre-reform scheme to the highest and lowest level respectively in the post-reform
scheme. The National School Board register also provided information on the type of
school attended, i.e. whether or not the student followed the new, post-reform school
system.
(4) Information from the National tax and the National education registers. Data
on several variables were obtained when the sample from 1961 were matched with the
National tax and National education registers from 1985-1996. Data for earnings are
measured as annual pre-tax earning from labor obtained from individual tax returns.
The National tax register also contains data for each year 1985-1996 on employment
status and whether or not each individual was self-employed.
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Table 13 shows the PC loadings for the ¯rst three principal components as well
as the percentage share of the total variance that each of these principal components
account for. It is evident from the results shown in Table 13 that the ¯rst PC, Abil1,
measures high ability, i.e. it gives positive weights to high IQ scores and high grades.
This is not true to the same extent for Abil2 and Abil3.
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